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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.

Whether the district court correctly dismissed counts
alleging violations of Acme Industry's NPDES permit
on the grounds that there were no continuing violations, thus rendering moot a section 505 action under
the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982)?

II.

Whether the district court erred in declining to rule on
the validity of the toxicity limit contained in Acme's
NPDES permit? Iii
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OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the District Court, No. Civ. 86-631, August 31, 1988, is unreported.
STATUTES INVOLVED
This case involves the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387, title 40 of the Code of Federal
7
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Regulations implementing that Act, and the Administrative
Procedure Act sections governing judicial review of administrative agency actions, 5 U.S.C. §§ 558, 701-706.1'
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Procedural History
Appellant Acme Industries, Inc. ("Acme") joins appeilee
National Council for the Protection of the Environment
("NCPE") and intervenor State of New Union in filing petitions to appeal controlling questions of law from the opinion
issued by the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Union in the case of National Council for the Protection of
the Environment v. Acme Industries, Inc., No. Civ. 86-631,
decided August 31, 1988. Order of the Court, Case No. 881001 (12th Cir. Sept. 15, 1988).
In that case NCPE alleged that Acme was in violation of
section 301(a)(1) of the Clean Water Act ("CWA" or "Act"),
33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(1) (R. 2). NCPE alleged that Acme had
violated the terms of past and present National Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permits issued pursuant to section 402 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342, to Acme's organic chemical manufacturing plant, located in Fairwater,
New Union (R. 2). The NPDES permits were issued by the
United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
subsequent to applications made to that agency by Acme (R.
3-4).
NCPE claimed jurisdiction under section 505 of the Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1365, which authorizes private citizens to enforce
the Act under certain circumstances (R. 2). NCPE sought an
injunction against future violations and civil penalties (R. 2).
The State of New Union filed a motion to intervene,
which was granted (R. 2)._2
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment (R.
2). The district court granted Acme's motion for summary
judgment and dismissed counts alleging pH, BOD, and TSS
violation's of Acme's permit (R; 11). The court held that any
such violations were moot on grounds that those violations are
not continuing violations as required to maintain a section 505
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/4
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action under the Clean Water Act (R. 11). NCPE is appealing
this decision.
Claiming that the district court had no jurisdiction to decide the matter, the court denied Acme's motion for summary
judgment as to the invalidity of the toxicity limit contained in
Acme's 1987 NPDES permit (R. 12). Acme appeals this
decision.
The district court found, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b),
that its ruling constituted "controlling issues of law as to
which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and
that immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation." (R. 13).
On September 15, 1988, the Twelfth Circuit, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291(b) and Rule 5 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, granted the parties' petitions for review.

II.

Factual Background

Appellant Acme Industries, Inc. ("Acme") is a manufacturing company that operates a plant in Fairwater, New
Union (R. 3). Acme manufactures organic chemicals which are
subsequently used in many of America's household products
(R. 3). The manufacturing process necessitates some discharge
ofI2 water and other substances into the Fairwater River (R.
3). This practice has been followed throughout the years since
Acme brought its plant to the city of Fairwater (R. 3).
In 1974, Acme applied for a permit from the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") under the National Pollution
Elimination Discharge System contained in the CWA, 33
U.S.C. § 1342 (R. 3). The permit set forth limitations on the
pH (acidity/alkalinity), the biological oxygen demand
("BOD") (organic material which consumes oxygen in river
water), and total suspended solids ("TSS") (organic particles
suspended in water) in the effluent released by Acme (R. 3).
The State of New Union certified the effluent limitations, saying that the limits met the state's water quality standards (R.
3). State certification of the limitations in NPDES permits is
required by section 401 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1341. The
State's standards were more stringent than those which would
9
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have met the EPA's national standards under 33 U.S.C. §
1311(b)(1)(A) (R. 4). In other words, the state's standards
called for a more stringent limitation than the "best practicable control technology" standard set by the EPA (R. 3).
Acme undertook the expense of installing a water treatment plant in an effort to meet these very stringent standards
before the July 1, 1977 deadline required by the NPDES permit (R. 4). For the most part Acme was able to meet the standards by July 1, 1977, but unfortunately not 100% of the time
(R. 4).
When the permit expired in 1979, Acme requested the
EPA to renew the permit (R. 4). The permit was extended by
operation of law with the same terms under 40 C.F.R. § 122.6
until July_1! 1987, when the EPA issued another permit with a
new set of standards (R. 4).
Under the 1987 permit, the pH limit remains the same
but the amounts of BOD and TSS which may be released are
increased (R. 5). The State of New Union certified these limitations to the EPA as necessary to meet the water quality
standards set for the Fairwater River by the state (R. 4-5).
The new limitations are still more stringent than those which
would have been required by the EPA as national standards
(R. 6).
Acme has demonstrated that with its new water treatment plant it is complying with the pH limits and is discharging far less than the amounts of BOD and TSS allowed by the
permit (R. 8). There have been rare occasions beyond Acme's
control, during a power outage and extreme weather conditions, when the new treatment plant was rendered inoperative
and the permit standards were temporarily exceeded (R. 6-8).
The new permit also added a new effluent standard, a
toxicity limitation (R. 4). This limitation is not required by
the Clean Water Act (R. 4). It is a limitation set solely by the
New Union Department of Environmental Protection ("Department") (R. 4). Acme challenged this standard in state
court on the basis that: 1) the water quality standard was void
for vagueness; 2) the Department failed to give adequate public notice of the action in violation of the state's Administrative Procedures Act, N. Un. Civ. Code § 36.108; 3) the effluent
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/4
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limit test was an arbitrary and capricious application of the
standard in that it measures the effect of the water_12 expelled
by Acme on saltwater brine shrimp rather than the effect on
any living creature actually existing in Fairwater River; and 4)
the Department offered no opportunity for comment or presentation of evidence with regard to adoption of the effluent
limit for the permit certification (R. 4-5). The state court denied Acme any relief, saying merely that it had no jurisdiction
to hear the case (R. 5).
Acme has worked diligently to meet this arbitrary standard and is pleased to report success in the last two years (R.
8). Acme remains opposed to the toxicity standard as it was
improperly promulgated and unnecessarily stringent (R. 5).
The company has taken its request for review to the EPA and
this administrative appeal is at present pending before the
Agency (R. 6)._2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
NCPE's claims as to BOD, TSS, and pH effluent limitations should be dismissed as moot. Acme's permit was validly
issued under the CWA. The fact that the high water quality of
the Fairwater River is unaffected is ample evidence supporting EPA's finding that the permit was consistent with the
CWA, including the new anti-backsliding provision. Thus, the
new permit is valid and supersedes the previous permit.
NCPE has no grounds to sue for violations of the previous
permit.
Acme is entitled to an upset defense in its permit. It has
complied with its permit to the utmost of its ability. The standards were only exceeded on rare occasions, due to circumstances completely beyond Acme's control. In order to make
the NPDES system viable, an upset defense must be contained in all federal permits, including Acme's. As the only
deviations from Acme's permit were permissible upsets,
NCPE has no claim for violations of the 1987 permit and its
suit is moot.
The state court dismissed the challenge of the toxicity
standards for lack of jurisdiction. The EPA is prohibited from
11
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reviewing the controversy by Agency regulations, and the circuit court has not been granted specific review of 33 U.S.C. §
1341 under the CWA's judicial review statute, 33 U.S.C. §
1369. Clearly, under these circumstances, Acme's challenge of
the toxicity limitations contained in its 1987 NPDES permit
should be heard in the district court pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act and federal question jurisdiction. 2
ARGUMENT
I. NCPE'S
MOOT.
A.

CITIZEN SUIT FOR ENFORCEMENT

IS

Acme's 1987 NPDES permit is valid.
1. The State of New Union complied with all permit procedures and conditions under the Clean
Water Act in revising the effluent limitations in
Acme's NPDES permit.

Acme's most recent NPDES permit ("1987 permit") was
issued by the EPA under section 1342(a)(1)(A) of the Clean
Water Act, which grants to the EPA authority to issue such
permits if the permit conditions comply with certain other
sections of the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1)(A) (1982). In this
case, section 1311 must be complied with in order to authorize
EPA to grant a permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1982).
Section 1311 provides that if federal effluent limitations
would be insufficient to meet state water quality standards,
states must establish any more stringent effluent limitations
which would bring state waters into compliance with state
standards. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (1982 & Supp. 1988).
Thereupon, with regard to permits like Acme's which are issued after February, 1987 pursuant to those provisions, compliance with those state promulgated effluent limitations by
permitees is required as expeditiously as practicable, but in no
case later than March 31, 1989. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(3)(B)
(1982 & Supp. 1988).
In this case, the State of New Union has aspired to water
quality standards in the Fairwater River which are even
higher-18 than those required by federal law. Those state stanhttps://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/4

12

APPELLANT BRIEF

1989]

dards approved by the EPA as consistent with the purposes of
the CWA, 40 C.F.R. § 131.5(a) (1987) limit the amount of permissible effluent discharge in permits issued by the EPA to
permitees along the Fairwater River. The effluent limitations
in Acme's 1987 permit have been certified by New Union as
consistent with the EPA approved state standards. Thus,
Acme's 1987 permit was validly issued under the provisions of
the CWA.
2.

The new permit standards are consistent with
the anti-backsliding requirements of the Clean
Water Act.

NCPE's contention that the 1987 permit is invalid under
the "anti-backsliding" provision of the CWA is entirely unfounded. Although section 1342(o) is a new provision as yet
largely uninterpreted by the courts, its meaning is plain on its
face. Likewise, it is plain that New Union's certification of
Acme's 1987 effluent limitations are in complete harmony
with that provision.
The anti-backsliding provision contained in section
1342(o) of the CWA regulates conditions under which effluent
limitations in NPDES permits may be modified. Acme's permit, established pursuant to section 1311(b)(1)(C), may only
be modified to contain a less stringent effluent limitation than
the previous permit if such modification is in compliance with
section 1313(d)(4). 33 U.S.C. § 1342(o)(1) (1982 & Supp.
1988).
Section 1313(d)(4) in turn limits revision of effluent limitations in two ways. First, where the applicable overalll 9
water quality standard has not been attained, a permit may
only be revised if its terms will assure attainment of the standard or the standard itself is revised to coordinate designated
uses of the water with the actual water quality attained. 33
U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(A) (1982 & Supp. 1988). Second, where
the water quality standard has been attained, effluent limitations based on a total maximum daily effluent limitation in an
NPDES permit may be revised to the extent that the revision
is consistent with the "antidegradation" policy of the CWA.
13
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33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(B) (1982 & Supp. 1988).
In this case, there is no indication that New Union's
water quality standards have not been attained. To the contrary, the original water quality standards were necessary to
"preserve" the quality of the river for sport fishing, boating,
and swimming purposes (R. 3). In addition, New Union increased permissible effluent discharge of Acme's operations
because other sources of effluent in the river had ceased, thus
allowing Acme to "increase its BOD and TSS discharges without violating the State's water quality standards" (R. 5). It is
clear from the record that the high water quality standards
for the Fairwater River have already been attained. Thus, effluent limitations in NPDES permits may be revised to the
extent they are consistent with the antidegradation policy of
the CWA.
The antidegradation policy referred to is defined in 40
C.F.R. § 131.12 (1987). Every state's ambient water quality
standard must contain an antidegradation policy in order to
be approved by the EPA. 40 C.F.R. § 131.6 (1987). At a minimum such policy must:_J2 1) protect existing uses designated
by the state; and 2) where the quality of water necessary to
support fish, wildlife, and recreation is achieved, it must be
maintained unless the state finds that lower water quality is
necessary to accommodate important local economic or social
development. If water quality standards are lowered out of economic or social necessity, the state is still required to assure
that the quality shall be at least sufficient to protect existing
designated uses of the water, and the state must guarantee
that it will impose the highest regulatory requirements for
point sources which discharge effluent into that water. 40
C.F.R. § 131.6 (1987).
New Union's ambient water quality standard is consistent
with the antidegradation policy required by the federal regulations. New Union has not changed its ambient water quality
standards. Rather, the ambient standards which were previously certified as necessary to protect the river for sport fishing, boating, and swimming are still in effect with respect to
BOD, TSS, and pH content. Acme's permit was changed because other discharges into the Fairwater River had ceased,
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/4
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allowing Acme's permit to be modified without any effect on
ambient water quality of existing uses of the river. Therefore,
the existing uses designated by the state are protected, as required by the federal regulations.
Additionally, the revised permit standards do not affect
the state's ability to maintain the quality of water necessary
to support fish, wildlife, and recreation. Again, the overall
quality of the water is not degraded by the modification ofiL 1
Acme's permit. Given the fact that the Fairwater River water
quality has not in any way been compromised by the effluent
limitations in the 1987 permit, the permit modification is
clearly consistent with the antidegradation policy of section
1313(d)(4) of the CWA.
3.

EPA's issuance of the 1987 permit constituted
implicit recognition of the legal validity of New
Union's water quality standards and certified effluent limitations for the Fairwater River.

The step-by-step process of EPA supervision of New
Union's water quality standards and effluent limitations ensures that the final NPDES permit is consistent with the
CWA as a whole, including the provisions regulating backsliding and degradation.
A water quality standard which is established pursuant to
state law automatically comes into effect unless the EPA Administrator finds that it is inconsistent with the chapter of the
CWA regulating standards and enforcement. 33 U.S.C. §
1313(c) (1982). Among the elements which must be part of a
state water quality standard submitted to the EPA for review
is an antidegradation policy. 40 C.F.R. § 131.6 (1987). If the
standard is deficient, the EPA must take steps to bring it into
compliance with the CWA. Otherwise, it becomes the water
quality standard for the state waters to which it applies. 33
U.S.C. § 1313(c) (1982).
Once a water quality standard is in effect for a body of
water, compliance with that standard is brought about by setting effluent limitations to govern the terms of permits which
will be issued to sources located along that body of-2 2 water.
15
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If a state like New Union has adopted a water quality standard that cannot be met by the effluent limitations established pursuant to federal law, it may adopt any more stringent effluent limits which are necessary to meet or maintain
that water quality standard. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (1982
& Supp. 1988). Such effluent limits must be certified by the
state, showing that the effluent limitations will not violate the
applicable water quality standard. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)
(1982). Finally, a federally issued permit under section 1342 of
the CWA must contain those effluent limitations necessary to
comply with the applicable water quality standards. 33
U.S.C.§ 1342(a) (1982).
In short, a federally issued NPDES permit is the result of
a thorough, step by step EPA review. For a permit to be issued, the EPA must find that the state water quality standards comply with the CWA (including the antidegradation
policy), that state certified effluent limitations will meet that
standard, and that the terms of the permit reflect those
conditions.
4.

The EPA's findings leading to the issuance of the
1987 NPDES permit were a proper exercise of
statutory authority.

In granting or denying a license, the EPA is required to
give an opportunity for a public hearing. 33 U.S.C. §
1342(a)(1) (1982). The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")
requires licensing hearings to be conducted in accordance with
sections 556 and 557 of that Act. 5 U.S.C. § 558 (1982).
Agency action conducted pursuant to those-l 3 sections may
be set aside by a reviewing court only if it is "unsupported by
substantial evidence." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1982). "The record
must include 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support' the EPA's determinations." Marathon Oil v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1266 (9th Cir.
1977) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S.
197 (1938)).
There is no evidence that the EPA's actions in granting
revisions of BOD and TSS effluent limitations in the 1987
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/4
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permit are valid under this standard. It is important to note
that the overall water quality of the Fairwater River remains
unaffected by the changed permit. NCPE contends that the
permit must be overturned by this court because it violates
the anti-backsliding provisions of section 1342. As noted
above, revision of effluent limitations for a water quality
based permit is permissible under that section only if it complies with the antidegradation policy of section 1313(d)(4).
The effluent limitations in Acme's 1987 permit are well
within that policy. The overall water quality has not been
changed, thus leaving intact all of New Union's designated
uses for the Fairwater River, including fish, wildlife, and recreation as required by the antidegradation provisions. It cannot be said that these permit terms are unsupported by substantial evidence. To the contrary, there is substantial
evidence in the record of the district court that the 1987 permit is not violative of the provisions of the CWA. It is not
unreasonable for an agency to grant a permit which does not
affect the overall quality of a body of water, and which requires more-L2 stringent standards than what would be required by federal law. Also, the fact that the 1987 permit
terms comply with the provisions of the CWA, as shown
above, mandates the conclusion that the EPA was not outside
its statutory authority in approving the revised effluent limitations and granting the 1987 permit.
The State of New Union perceived Acme's consistent progress in cleaning up its manufacturing process, and in recognition of that effort, has taken advantage of the termination of
other sources to revise Acme's effluent limitations, thus making it possible for Acme to operate within the law. This court
should encourage, not hinder, this partnership between government and industry in the national effort to eliminate water
pollution.
B.

Acme is in
permit.

compliance with the 1987 NPDES

Acme is aware of its duty under federal law not to discharge effluent except in accordance with a valid NPDES per-
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mit. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1982). It is clear that Acme is complying with that obligation.
There has not been a single violation of the pH standard
in Acme's NPDES permit since June, 1985 when Acme installed a sophisticated, computer operated lime addition system. The only deviation during that period was caused by a
power outage beyond Acme's control (R. 7-8).
As to the stringent BOD and TSS standards imposed by
New Union, Acme has made substantial and continuing progress in its efforts to continuously reduce the levels of these
pollutants-l 5 (R. 8). As a result of its continual efforts to reduce water pollution, Acme has achieved effluent limits consistent with those in the 1987 permit since 1986 (R. 8). But
Acme did not cease its efforts the moment it reached the legal
minimum; instead, it has worked to improve its effluent reduction performance over time (R. 8). Acme has installed
modern treatment facilities and redesigned its manufacturing
process to increase the efficiency of its treatment process (R.
8).
Since the 1987 permit was issued, there has been only one
instance of exceeding the BOD and TSS permit limitations. In
a period of extreme cold during the winter of 1987 the treatment process was adversely affected (R. 8). These incidents
were permissible deviations under the NPDES system.
C.

The only incidents of noncompliance with the 1987
NPDES permit were permissible upsets.
1. All federal NPDES permit holders are entitled to
an upset defense.

Federal law makes available an affirmative defense of
"upset" in suits for enforcement of federally issued NPDES
permits. This defense was first established in Marathon Oil v.
EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977).
In Marathon Oil, the 9th Circuit held that permits, which
on their face require 100 percent compliance, are invalid
under the CWA. The court found that since the standard necessarily involved some incidents of noncompliance due to the
occasional fallibility of technology, it would be unreasonable
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/4
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to set an impossible standard requiring compliance at all
times with the-L1 effluent limitations. As a matter of policy, it
was held to be preferable to base liability on whether the deviations were avoidable. If so, it would be consistent with the
CWA to enforce the permit against the violator.
In so holding, the court rejected EPA's contention that it
could allow for unavoidable accidents by declining to prosecute. The court noted that EPA's magnanimity would not alter the permit holder's liability to citizen enforcement suits,
and that if EPA were to enforce, the permittee could not request dismissal on the basis of an unavoidable accident. Id. at
1273. Therefore, the court required EPA to include an upset
provision in the permit.
Although it was not expressly stated that Marathon Oil
mandates upset provisions for water quality based permits
(effluent limits set to achieve ambient water quality standards) in addition to those which contain technology based
standards (effluent limitations requiring implementation of
certain technologies), the rationale of Marathon Oil clearly
applies to water quality based permits. There are two overriding policies which must be considered. First, whether a permittee will be held liable for uncontrolled or unanticipated
circumstances, even though all due care is taken to comply
with the terms of the permit. Second, whether a permittee is
entitled to notice as to what will constitute a violation, rather
than having to wait to be sued. The interests underlying these
two important policies are identical for water quality based
permit holders and technology based permit holders._2 7
As to the first element, there is no evidence that the
CWA was intended to be a strict liability system. Rather, the
regulatory system requires all effluent sources to employ their
best efforts to move toward the national goal of eventual elimination of pollutants from the nation's waters. 33 U.S.C. §
1251(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1982). This is reflected in the standards imposed by the CWA.
For example, the NPDES permit for Marathon Oil required application of the best practicable control technology
currently available. Marathon Oil at 1257. That standard is
based on "the average performance of the best existing
19
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plants", taking into account the relation between the costs
and benefits of effluent reduction by a particular method.
American Meat Institute v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 453 (7th Cir.
1975); 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (1982); 33 U.S.C. §
1314(b)(1)(B) (1982 & Supp. 1988). In other words, a permittee is not required to implement effluent reductions at any
cost; the CWA has due regard to the importance of reducing
effluent without destroying the industry which produces them.
Similarly, the "best control technology currently available" standard imposed by the CWA requires consideration of
the "reasonableness of the relationship between the costs of
attaining a reduction in effleuents, and the effluent reduction
benefits derived . . . ." 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (1982 &
Supp. 1988). Again, the statute harmonizes the need for effluent reduction with the need for viable industry. This inherent
policy of the CWA cannot be construed to require an industry
to be held liable for_2 8 incidents completely beyond its
control.
Such an interpretation would not weaken the regimen of
the CWA. "The EPA is free . . . to place the burden on the
permit holder of producing relevant data and proving that the
upset could not have been prevented." Marathon Oil at 1273.
A properly limited upset provision for all NPDES permits:
Imparts a construction of "reasonableness" to the standards as a whole and adopts a more flexible system of regulation than can be had by a system devoid of "give." ...
[A] regulatory system which allows flexibility, and a lessening of firm proscriptions in a proper case, can lend
strength to the system as a whole. "The limited safety
valve permits a more rigorous adherence to an effective
regulation."
Portland Cement Assoc. v. Ruckleshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 399
(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417, U.S. 921 (1974) (quoting
InternationalHarvester Co. v. Ruckleshaus, 478 F. 2d 615,
641 (D.C. Cir. 1973)) (citations omitted).
The second factor in deciding whether an upset defense
should be available to water quality based permit holders is
whether they are any less entitled than technology based perhttps://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/4
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mit holders to notice of what will constitute a violation of the
CWA for which they will be held liable. Courts which have
considered this issue have overwhelmingly answered in the
affirmative.
In PortlandCement, the D.C. Circuit considered whether
it was necessary to include formal upset provisions under the
Clean Air Act. The court recognized that '[c]ompanies must
be on notice as to what constitutes a violation." Id. at 399.
Where no formal upset defense exists, the EPA can only limit
liability for unauthorized effluent discharge due to extraordinary circumstances by otherwise properly equipped and 2'
operated plants by choosing not to enforce the permit. That
method of enforcement is inadequate.
As the Marathon Oil court pointed out, discretionary enforcement is small consolation to a permittee whom the EPA
chooses to sue, since it can never anticipate under what circumstances it may be held liable. Indeed, if there is no way to
anticipate liability, a permittee has no means or incentive to
find ways to improve performance.
In sum, it would be incompatible with the basic premise
of the CWA, as well as inconsistent with fundamental notions
of fair play and justice, to hold that formal upset provisions
are not required in all NPDES permits. Such a provision
would not undermine the goals of the CWA because Marathon Oil limited its definition of upset to those beyond the
control of the permit holder. Marathon Oil at 1272. To hold
that an upset defense is not required would deprive permittees of the means and incentive to implement the most efficient treatment technology. If enforcement is uncertain industries will not do their utmost to avoid upsets. But, if liability
can be avoided by constant proper operation of treatment facilities and the installation of technology sufficient to meet all
foreseeable needs, the goals of the CWA will be advanced.
Thus, whether or not upset provisions exist, deviations from
permit limitations will continue to occur under extraordinary
circumstances. The sole question is whether the permit holder
should be required to bear the burden for something which it
could not prevent._20
21
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Acme is entitled to an upset defense in its 1987
NPDES permit.

The underlying rationale of the Marathon Oil holding applies to Acme's water quality based permit. There have been
only two instances of noncompliance with Acme's 1987 permit. The effluent limitation for pH content was exceeded
when a power outage halted the operations of the pH treatment system (R. 6). The problem was immediately corrected
thereafter when power returned to the plant (R. 6-7). The effluent limitations in the 1987 permit for BOD and TSS were
exceeded during a period of extreme cold during the winter of
1987, which adversely affected the treatment process (R. 8).
Acme is entitled to an upset defense for both of these incidents. In both cases the cause of the problem was due to
circumstances completely beyond Acme's control. There is no
showing that Acme is guilty of improper operation of its facilities. Acme had already done everything in its capacity to improve its treatment processes, yet its improved performance
was not enough to avoid the effects of these extreme
conditions.
D.

A citizen enforcement suit may not be maintained
where there are no ongoing current violations of a
NPDES permit.

Section 1365 of the CWA authorizes any citizen to bring a
civil action against any person alleged to be in violation of an
effluent limitation. The United States Supreme Court has
read the language of that section as proscribing citizen suits
for wholly past violations. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 108 S. Ct. 376
(1987). That2' holding precludes NCPE from maintaining a
suit against Acme either for the occasional violations of its
present permit or for violations of its previous permit.
"Wholly past violations" include violations of existing
permits which are no longer continuing. However, the Court
did note that suit could be brought where a permit holder is
not in violation at the moment of suit but is likely to violate
again in the future. The Court gave an example of such an
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/4
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intermittent violator as "one who violates permit limitations
one month out of every three . . . ." Id. at 384. Clearly, the
Court was referring to regular and consistent violations separated by significant time intervals where the permit holder
has not corrected the cause of the violations.
This definition excludes Acme's circumstances. In Acme's
case there have only been two violations of the 1987 permit
terms. In one case the pH standard was exceeded during a
power outage (R. 6-7). In another incident different effluent
limitations for BOD and TSS were exceeded in a period of
extreme cold during the winter of 1987 (R. 8). Thus, each
standard was violated only once in circumstances which are
not likely to recur, and which in any case are completely beyond Acme's control. These are not the type of circumstances
the Court had in mind when it defined an intermittent polluter as one who repeatedly and consistently violates permit
standards.
"Wholly past violations" also exclude citizen enforcement
for violations of a previous permit which is no longer in force.
The Supreme Court in Gwaltney relied heavily on the present
tense in the statutory language of section 1365 in_2 2 holding
that citizen suits could not be maintained for wholly past violations. Id. at 381-82. The Court noted that such a suit could
only be maintained for a violation of a permit limitation
"which is in effect" under the CWA. Id.; 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f)
(1982). Based on the Court's reasoning and the clear language
of the statute, it is apparent that suit may not be maintained
for violations of a previous permit.
This conclusion is also inherent in the concept of mootness which does not allow maintenance of a suit where "there
is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated."
United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)
(quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148
F.2d 416, 448 (2d Cir. 1945)). Furthermore, NCPE's suit for
violation of Acme's expired permit is invalid under article III
of the U.S. Constitution which only permits a court to hear an
actual "case or controversy." U.S. Const. art. III.
Acme has shown that the 1987 permit was issued in compliance with all the procedural and substantive requirements
23
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of the CWA. The 1987 permit is valid and in effect, superseding any previous NPDES permits issued to Acme. The rare
incidents of noncompliance with the 1987 permit terms are
not violations, but are attributable to permissible upsets
which should be included in Acme's NPDES permit as a matter of federal law. Since there are no continuing violations of
Acme's past or present NPDES permits, NCPE has no
grounds to subject Acme to a suit for enforcement under section 1365 of_2 3 the CWA. Therefore, under the rule of law
unambiguously stated in the CWA and unequivocally interpreted by the Supreme Court, NCPE's claims are moot and
must be dismissed.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
RULE. ON THE VALIDITY OF THE TOXICITY
LIMIT IN ACME'S NPDES PERMIT.
A.

The state and district courts both deny jurisdiction
over a challenge of the validity of the toxicity
limitation.

A year after this case was filed in district court, EPA issued a new NPDES permit to Acme (R. 4). The new permit,
issued in July, 1987, added an additional effluent limitation:
"The discharge shall not be toxic to the indigenous biota of
the Fairwater River such that a 10% concentration of the
treated effluent kills more than 50% of test species in a 96
hour in situ bioassay performed in accordance with EPA's
standard test method." (R. 4).
The State of New Union required this effluent limitation
in its section 1341 certification of the 1987 NPDES permit,
adding that the "effluent limitation was developed by the New
Union Department of Environmental Protection to implement
the state's narrative water quality standard which forbids the
discharge of 'toxic chemicals in toxic amounts.'" (R. 4).
EPA's standard test method for measuring toxicity involves using brine shrimp as a test organism (R. 8). Brine
shrimp are a salt water species and do not naturally inhabit
the Fairwater River, nor could they survive in fresh water (R.
8).
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/4
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Acme immediately challenged the new standard by filing
a complaint in state court (R. 4). Acme based its complaint
on_124 the following:
1) the water quality standard was void for vagueness;
2) the standard had been adopted without following the
state's Administrative Procedures Act, N.Un. Civ.
Code 836.108;
3) the effluent limit was an arbitrary and capricious application of the standard; and
4) the Department afforded no opportunity for comment or presentation of evidence with regard to adoption of the effluent limit for the permit certification.

(R. 4-5).
The state court summarily dismissed Acme's challenge,
stating merely that the state court had no jurisdiction to hear
the complaint (R. 5).
In the interim, NCPE moved in district court to amend
its complaint to include violations of the new toxicity limitation (R. 5). The motion was granted (R. 5). Acme brought its
challenge of the legality of the standard to the district court
as a defense to NCPE's claims. Acme asked the district court
to first rule on the validity of the toxicity limit in Acme's
NPDES permit before ruling on NCPE's claims. The district
court, like the state court, refused to hear the challenge echoing the state court's denial of jurisdiction (R. 12). The court
held that review of the validity of the toxicity limitation
would be proper before the EPA in an administrative appeal
with subsequent appellate review before the Twelfth Circuit
(R. 12).
The district court also held that the toxicity limitationsi2L were effective and enforceable (R. 12). What the
court failed to realize was that by joining the state court in
denying jurisdiction over Acme's case, the court left Acme
with no forum in which to bring its challenge to the arbitrary
toxicity limitations which have been imposed by the State of
New Union.
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The state certification process mandated by the
Clean Water Act does not designate a forum for
review.

The CWA does not designate a process for review or a
forum for appealing an improperly promulgated effluent limitation contained in the state certification of a proposed
NPDES permit.
Prior to issuance of an NPDES permit, the state must
certify the effluent limitations needed to meet the state water
quality standards. The state certification procedures under
the CWA are codified in section 401, 33 U.S.C. § 1341.
Congress intended that the states develop their own permit programs, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b), and as an interim step, the
certification provisions allow states which do not administer
an NPDES permit program to be involved in the process.
"The purpose of the certification mechanism ... is to assure
that Federal licensing or permitting agencies cannot override
state water quality requirements." 1972 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News, 3735 (92d Cong.). EPA continues to have veto
power over certification and NPDES permits, but the states,
through denial of certification, may also forbid the issuance of
an NPDES permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).12"
Despite congressional intent to keep the states involved
in the process, Congress failed to provide a forum for judicial
review of state actions taken pursuant to the federal statute.
Two sections of the CWA provide for judicial review of actions taken pursuant to the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 and 33
U.S.C. § 1369. Neither section provides for judicial review of
section 1341 certification. This has resulted in a variety of rulings by the federal courts attempting to interpret the intent of
Congress.
1. A few federal courts have designated the state
courts for jurisdiction over section 1341
certification.
The courts have tried to fill the void where Congress was
less than clear about its intended forum for challenges to state
actions under section 1341. In the legislative history the fol-
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lowing comment is recorded:
It should also be noted the Committee continues the authority of the State . . . to act to deny a permit and
thereby prevent a Federal license from issuing to a discharge source with such State ....Should such an affirmative denial occur no license or permit could be issued ...
unless the State action was overturned in the appropriate courts of jurisdiction.
1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3735 (92nd Cong.) (emphasis added).
Although the CWA does not set forth a forum for appeal
of state certification decisions, some courts have found that
certification under section 1341 is set up as "an exclusive prerogative of the state." Mobile Oil Corp. v. Kelly, 426 F. Supp.
230, 234 (S.D. Ala. 1976). Mobile Oil holds that the "parties
seeking initial relief in a federal district court andI2 7 bypassing available avenues of state relief should be directed to
state avenues when the questions involved concern the workings of a state regulatory scheme, state political question, or
the interpretation of state agency orders under state law." Id.;
see also, Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park v. EPA, 684 F.2d
1041, 1056 (1st Cir. 1982).
In the instant case, the district court did not find jurisdiction in the state court but held that proper review would be
through the EPA with an appeal available thereafter in the
court of appeals.
In Lake Erie Alliance, Etc. v. United States Army Corps
of Engineers, 526 F. Supp. 1063 (W.D. Pa. 1981), the State of
Ohio had certified an NPDES permit and the certification was
reviewed by the Ohio Environmental Board of Review, whose
decision had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Franklin County, Ohio. The district court cited Mobile Oil and
agreed that the state had the exclusive right to review section
1341 certification. The court then addressed the res judicata
effect of the state court ruling: "Res judicata makes concIusive
a final valid judgment, and if the judgment is on the merits,
precludes further litigation of the same cause of action by the
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parties ....[T]here is no question but that the Ohio decision
was a final one on the merits." Id. at 1074.
Acme's case can be distinguished from Lake Erie Alliance because the state court in this case did not rule on the
merits, but merely dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Here
there has leen no res judicata effect in this case, and therefore Acme's challenge may be heard in another forum..2 8
The issue of no state remedy was addressed in United
States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977). The
court held that "[aIssuming that the state standards are consistent with the Act and are not reviewable in the state courts
...the only remaining possible challenge is a federal action
against the state officers responsible for their enforcement alleging deprivation of a federal constitutional right." Id. at 836.
The court in U.S. Steel added that the hearing may encompass the issue of whether the procedure by which the state
adopted its regulations "offended" due process. Id. The procedure by which New Union adopted the arbitrary toxicity limitation in its state certification and which EPA included in
Acme's NPDES permit certainly offended due process.
As noted above, Acme challenged the validity of the toxicity limitation promulgated by the New Union Department
of Environmental Protection in the state of New Union. That
court's refusal to accept jurisdiction left Acme with two alternatives: 1) appeal to the EPA; or 2) petition the district court
to rule on the toxicity limitation's validity in NCPE's suit
against Acme, and then rule on the Acme's alleged violation.
Since the State of New Union is a party to that suit, Acme
would be bringing the claim against those who had promulgated the disputed toxicity limitation. Both appeals appear
futile in that the district court denied jurisdiction and EPA is
not permitted by regulation to hear Acme's challenge.-12 9
2.

EPA is prohibited by Its regulations from reviewing state certification under section 1341.

The district court in this case appears to believe that
Acme is not foreclosed from challenging the regulations despite that court's refusal to find jurisdiction. The court seems
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to find solace in the fact that Acme had filed for review before
the EPA and thereafter could supposedly seek review of the
EPA decision in the Twelfth Circuit. However, the federal
regulations and the courts clearly establish that EPA has no
jurisdiction to hear Acme's challenge to the validity of statemade toxicity limitations.
EPA was charged with the task of developing guidelines
and regulations for the CWA. Challenges to EPA rulemaking
may be made under 40 C.F.R. Part 124. The regulations speak
directly to challenges made to state-mandated effluent limitations contained in the state certification of the NPDES permit: "Review and appeals of limitations attributable to State
certification shall be made through the applicable procedures
of the State and may not be made through the procedures in
this part." 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(e) (1987). Thus, the EPA is
foreclosed from hearing any challenge to the toxicity limitation promulgated by the State of New Union, which EPA included in Acme's 1987 NPDES permit.
The courts have followed this rule. The district court in
Lake Erie Alliance, Etc., 526 F. Supp. 1063, held that "state
certification under the Clean Water Act is set up as the exclusive prerogative of the state and is not to be reviewed by any
agency of the federal government." Id. at 1074; see also, 13
Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park, 684 F.2d 1041, 1056.

The Seventh Circuit made a similar determination in
U.S. Steel, 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977), in an action challenging state water quality standards. The statutory provisions,
regulations, and responsibilities for promulgating state water
quality standards are similar to those for state certification of
effluent limitations. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1982); 33 U.S.C. § 1341
(1982). The court in U.S. Steel held that the EPA had a limited scope of review of the state promulgated standards. The
court noted that the EPA's only authority to review the standards is conferred by section 1313 of the Act which empowers
the Agency to determine whether the standard meets or is
consistent with the applicable requirements of the Act. Since
section 1311(b)(1)(C), preserves the right of the states to impose limitations more stringent than the federal limitations
and requires the EPA to include those more stringent limita-
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tions, the court found that the Agency had been given no authority to set aside or modify those limitations in a permit
proceeding. Although the plaintiff in U.S. Steel argued that
the district court should have required EPA to consider the
constitutionality of the state water quality standards, the district court held that the Agency had no authority to consider
the validity of the standards and denied relief. The Seventh
Circuit affirmed._ 123
Accordingly, Acme is foreclosed from EPA review by
Agency regulations and by judicial decisions, as well as being
denied a forum in the state or district courts on jurisdictional
grounds.
C.

Since section 1369 specifically provides for judicial
review in the court of appeals of certain sections of
the CWA, all other sections should be entitled to jurisdiction in the district court.
1. The federal courts refuse to grant jurisdiction in
the court of appeals to claims under CWA sections which are not enumerated in section 1369.

The district court in this case has ruled that the Twelfth
Circuit has jurisdiction to review Acme's challenge to the toxicity limitation only after EPA has finished a review of the
issue. As previously noted, under EPA's own regulations the
Agency is not able to review the state certification. Further, it
is questionable whether even the court of appeals has jurisdiction to review the validity of the toxicity limitation.
The CWA strictly controls the right of review under the
Act. According to section 509 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1369,
the promulgation of national standards of performance (33
U.S.C. §§ 1316-17), the initial issuance of permits by the EPA
(33 U.S.C. § 1342), the decision to allow or deny state assumption of the permit program (33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)), the promulgation of the national regulations limiting effluent discharges
(33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1312, 1316 & 1345), and the approval or
disapproval of state individual control strategies (33 U.S.C. §
1314(1)) are all reviewable within 120 days in the court of appeals for the circuit in _12 which the plaintiff does business or
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resides. 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1988).
Congress chose to limit federal circuit court review to the
above mentioned sections of the Act. Section 1341, the state
certification section at issue in this case, was not a provision
Congress chose to have reviewed by the circuit court, even
though there has been controversy over the proper forum for
such review (See Lake Erie Alliance, 526 F. Supp. 1063; Mobile Oil Corp., 426 F. Supp. 230) and despite congressional
amendment of section 1369 as recently as 1987.
It is helpful, when analyzing where jurisdiction lies for judicial review of section 1341 challenges, to note what the
courts have held on challenges to other CWA sections which
were omitted from section 1369 review. As noted above, a
closely analogous section is section 1313, which calls for state
development of water quality standards. As noted above, section 1313 is statutorily similar to section 1341. Like section
1341, section 1313 decisions by the state are reviewed and approved or disapproved by EPA. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(3) (1982).
There is no provision in section 1369 for judicial review in the
court of appeals of EPA's decision to approve or disapprove
the state water quality standards.
The Second Circuit in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA,
538 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1976), a case in which Bethlehem Steel
Corporation challenged the water quality standards issued by
the State of New York, concluded that review must begin in
the district court according to the provisions of the Adminis33
trative Procedure Act. The arguments were as follows.1
Since section 1369 did not provide for review of the
EPA's action under section 1313, Bethlehem Steel attempted
to characterize the approval process as part of the approval of
effluent limitations under section 1311. This was similar to an
argument used successfully in earlier cases challenging the
meaning of section 1369. See E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co.
v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977). Bethlehem Steel argued that
this interpretation would avoid the bifurcated review that
would arise if review of the issuance of effluent limitations occurred in the court of appeals, while review of the EPA approval of state water quality plans was heard in the district
courts. Bethlehem Steel at 517. The court admitted concern
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about the possibility of piecemeal litigation, but expressed
more concern about the congressional intent behind section
1369: "[Ilt seems . . . that when a jurisdictional statute sets
forth with such specificity the actions of an administrative
agency which may be reviewed in the court of appeals, a litigant seeking such review of an action that is not specified
bears a particularly heavy burden." Id. at 518.
Defendant EPA argued that section 1369 provided review
for only those actions which have a national impact. Since
state water quality standards are limited to waters within a
particular state, there is no national impact. The Agency contended that prompt review of national standards is of greater
importance because of the far greater number of affected
individuals.
The Second Circuit was convinced by EPA's argument,
and although the court felt that review of all EPA actions
should L" be in one court, the court concluded that it was
constrained by congressional intent as evidenced by the specificity of section 1369.
Congress has demonstrated the same intent to prevent
court of appeals review of the state certification process under
section 1341 by choosing not to include that section in section
1369.
The circuit court in Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. Train, 519 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1975), found jurisdiction
in the district court for review of EPA's promulgation of toxic
substance standards. The court found that since the Act did
not provide for review of the challenged EPA action under
section 1369, it "would be consigned to jurisdictional limbo
under FWPCA," Id. at 291, and therefore the district court
had jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act. The
court held that the APA provided for review of administrative
actions not expressly made unreviewable by the Act to determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion. 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A); NRDC, Inc. at 291.
In Central Hudson Gas, Etc. v. EPA, 587 F.2d 549 (2d
Cir. 1978), the court clearly set forth the issue of congressional
intent as it applies to section 1369:

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/4
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It is clear that if the agency action sought to be reviewed
falls within one of the . . . categories described in 33

U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1), the jurisdiction of the court of appeals is exclusive .... It is also clear, however, that the..
. categories . . . do not cover all forms of possible agency
action . . . . 'If Congress had so intended, it could have

provided that all EPA action under the statute would be
subject to review in the court of appeals, rather than
specifying particular actions and leaving out other[s].'
Id. at 556-57 (quoting Bethlehem Steel, 538 F.2d 513, 517).21
2.

This case should find jurisdiction in the district
court under the Administrative Procedure Act
and under federal question jurisdiction.

The general grant of federal question jurisdiction is found
in 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), which gives the district courts jurisdiction to review federal agency actions. Califano v. Sanders, 430
U.S. 99 (1977). The issue Acme raised in the district court
arises under the laws of the United States because the basis
for Acme's action is a violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1341. The CWA
does not contain any provision that precludes review of this
action by the district court. "[O]nly upon a showing of 'clear
and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent
should the courts restrict access to judicial review." Abbott
Laboratoriesv. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967). There has
been no such showing in this case.
The Court in Central Hudson Gas, after enumerating the
benefits which result from a system in which issues of law are
resolved first by the district court and then by the court of
appeals concluded:
[W]e are not inclined to favor an expansive construction
of our own exclusive jurisdiction, because to do so would
deprive us of the wisdom and sound judgment which the
district judges apply to questions we are eventually called
upon to review. It is reasonable to assume that Congress
intended us to have the help we need.
Central Hudson Gas at 557.
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Acme's challenge is not of national importance needing
expeditious review in the court of appeals. This is an issue of
a permit issued to one company which contains an unlawfully
promulgated effluent limitation mandated by a state
agency.12 6 The district court is the proper forum to examine
the validity of a defective state action which profoundly affects a federally mandated permit issued by a federal agency
pursuant to federal law.
The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706,
also provides for district court review of Acme's claim. The
APA provides that "[a] person . . . adversely affected by an
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982). Section 704 reads: "Agency action made reviewable by statute
and final agency action for which there is no other adequate
remedy in a court are subject to judicial review." 5 U.S.C. §
704 (1982).
The toxicity limitation attached to New Union's state
certification was incorporated into the NPDES permit issued
by EPA, thus becoming an "agency action." The Agency reviewed the effluent limitations in the state certification for
compliance with the CWA and found that the limitations were
more stringent than those required by the Act (R. 6). The effluent limitations, including the toxicity limitation, were incorporated pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(c). The permit
issued by the Administrator became a final agency action.
The APA, in section 706, allows the district court to
"hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be- (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law; ...
(C) without observance of procedure required by law; ... " 5
U.S.C. § 706(2) (1982). In the instant case, Acme2-L will be
able to demonstrate the arbitrary nature of the toxicity limitation. Acme has shown that the state agency failed to hold
appropriate hearings and violated a statutorily mandated notice period. EPA requires that the states develop procedures
for public notice and public hearings prior to the issuance of
state certifications. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). Logically, EPA
should expect that state certification is completed in accorhttps://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/4
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dance with the notice and hearing provisions. Therefore, if
EPA issues a NPDES permit with provisions unlawfully
promulgated by the state, it would follow that the permit
would be defective and would be ripe for review under the
Administrative Procedure Act.
III.

IF THE CIRCUIT COURT FINDS THAT THE DISTRICT COURT LACKS JURISDICTION, REVIEW
OF THE VALIDITY OF THE TOXICITY LIMITATION CONTAINED IN ACME'S NPDES PERMIT
SHOULD BE HEARD IN THE TWELFTH CIRCUIT
COURT OF APPEALS.

If this court finds that there is no jurisdiction in the district court to hear Acme's petition, this court should find jurisdiction in the court of appeals for review of the validity of
the disputed toxicity limitation in Acme's NPDES permit.
The 1987 NPDES permit which the EPA issued to Acme contained the toxicity limitation. Thus EPA has approved that
limitation pursuant to the federal regulations. EPA made a
determination that the toxicity limitation proposed by the
State of New Union was at least as stringent as its own standards and limitations (R. 6). 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1982); 33
U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (1982).
The issue of challenges to the explicit authority for_28 judicial review under section 1369 has been raised in the past.
Soon after the FWPCA of 1972 was passed, EPA promulgated
effluent guidelines under section 304, 33 U.S.C. § 1314, a section which Congress did not grant section 1369 review. Because of the ambiguity of the APA's authority under section
301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311, challenges were brought in both the district court and the court of appeals. Jurisdiction was premised
in the court of appeals under section 1369. Review was sought
in the district court under the Administrative Procedure Act
(5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706), the Declaratory Judgement Act (28
U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202), and under federal question jurisdiction
(28 U.S.C. § 1331).
The Supreme Court decided the question in 1977, concluding that the EPA did have section 1311 authority to issue
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effluent limitations and that this authority encompassed the
guidelines issued under section 1314. E.I. duPont de Nemours
& Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977). Therefore, the federal
court of appeals was judged to have jurisdiction to hear cases
concerning section 304.
The E.I. duPont court found that Congress intended
through section 1369 to strictly control the right of review because the legislators recognized that courts would find most
EPA actions reviewable under the APA. Therefore, Congress
limited review to the forum which would be most expeditious,
thereby preventing a bifurcated review process.
EPA has oversight of the state-created effluent limitations under section 1311(b)(1)(C), and section 1369 provides
court of appeals review of section 1311. Thus, theJ29 court of
appeals should have the ability to review the toxicity limitation in Acme's NPDES permit. Section 1341 mandates that
the state must base its certification on a number of CWA sections, including sections 1311 and 1317. Section 1311 concerns
effluent limitations and section 1317 provides for standards
for toxic materials. Both sections are reviewable under section
1369.
Section 1311(b)(1)(C) effectively incorporates into federal
law all state water quality standards, schedules of compliance,
laws, or regulations which are more stringent than otherwise
provided by federal law. Therefore, the court of appeals
should be an appropriate court to review Acme's NPDES permit and the toxicity limitation contained in that permit.
Issues are ripe for review in the court of appeals under
1369 after the APA has issued the permit, and no review by
the EPA is required as suggested by the district court in this
case.
If this court does not find that the district court erred in
dismissing Acme's request for review of the state certification
of the NPDES permit, then Acme is without a forum to challenge the toxicity limitations. To reiterate, Acme has been denied jurisdiction by both the state and district courts. Acme is
prohibited by EPA regulations from gaining review before the
Agency. Because of this lack of due process, immediate review
should be granted by this court under section 1369.1L0
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/4
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CONCLUSION
Acme petitions this court to provide a forum for Acme's
challenge concerning validity of the arbitrary and vague toxicity limitation mandated by the state in its certification of the
1987 NPDES permit approved and issued by the EPA. The
district court is the proper forum to hear that limited challenge. In the alternative, Acme asks this court to be the court
of last resort, hear the challenge, and render an opinion as to
the legality of the toxicity limitation.
The scope of Acme's 1987 permit for other pollutants is
defined by the high level of water quality New Union has set
for the Fairwater River. Acme and the State of New Union
are working together to preserve the Fairwater River. Acme is
applying state of the art technology, gradually reducing its effluent discharge every year. The State of New Union, recognizing Acme's good faith effort, has taken advantage of the
cessation of other point sources in the area to modify Acme's
permit, allowing Acme to operate in compliance with the
CWA without adversely affecting the high water quality of the
Fairwater River. This is the kind of partnership which the
EPA has approved as allowing the maximum benefit to society while ensuring progress toward the ultimate goals of the
CWA: reasonable further progress toward the total elimination of water pollution. This court should encourage this type
of partnership by allowing New Union to offset effluent reductions in order to allow other sources to operate in compliance
with the law and within the bounds of technological
feasibility.
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